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Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether children are better off if their parents have more
elaborate social networks. Using data on high-school friendships of parents, we analyze
whether the number and characteristics of friends affect the labor-market outcomes of
children. While parental friendships formed in high school appear long lasting, we find no
significant impact on their children’s occupational choices and earnings prospects. These
results do not change when we account for network endogeneity, network persistency,
and network measurement error. Only when children enter the labor market do friends
of parents have a marginally significant but small influence on their occupational choice.
Keywords: Informal job search; intergenerational effects; occupational choice;
social networks
JEL classification: A14; J 24; J 46; J 62
I. Introduction
Social networks are widely considered important for labor-market outcomes
(Jackson, 2010). In search models, social networks are typically thought
of as informal job-search channels providing job searchers with either
information about open vacancies or background references,
*This research uses the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. The WLS has been supported principally by the National Institute on Aging. We
thank seminar and conference participants in Amsterdam, Braga, and Ljubljana, as well as
two anonymous referees, for their comments and suggestions.
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recommendations and job referrals (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1973).
Furthermore, in surveys, social networks are often mentioned as one of
the main channels through which job searchers find jobs (Holzer, 1987,
1988; Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Cappellari and Tatsiramos, 2015).
However, quantifying social networks and their impact on labor-market
success has proved difficult. First, social networks are often loosely defined
and can take many shapes and forms, ranging from family members and
friends to colleagues, dormmates, neighbors, and ethnic-minority groups.1
Second, information on social networks is rarely collected together with
information on labor-market outcomes. Third, causal inference is difficult
due to the potential endogeneity of network connections (Manski, 1993;
Bramoullé et al., 2009).
In this paper, we are the first to examine whether children are better off
if their parents have more elaborate social networks. Specifically, we focus
on the high-school friendships of parents and test whether the number and
characteristics of high-school friends affect the labor-market outcomes of
children. Our empirical strategy takes into account some of the selectivity
effects that are common to studies on the labor-market consequences of
social networks. In particular, we examine how sensitive our results are to
network measurement error, network persistency, and network endogeneity.
We use data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS). The WLS
contains detailed information on a random sample of Wisconsin high-
school graduates in 1957 (Hauser, 2009 provides an overview of the
WLS structure). Respondents are asked about their friendship connections
in high school, which can be used to reconstruct the underlying friendship
network. Respondents also report their children’s occupational choice,
which we measure in terms of prospective earnings and interpret as
a proxy for lifetime earnings. We exploit the richness of the WLS,
including information on the respondents’ cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, educational attainment and other socioeconomic variables, to
account for many of the individual characteristics that possibly confound
friendship ties. The WLS information on friendship ties has been used
before by Conti et al. (2013).
We start our empirical analysis by examining whether children, parents,
and high-school friends of parents make similar occupational choices. We
do not find evidence for the presence of friendship-network effects. We find
positive correlations between the occupations of children and the friends
of their parents, but these positive correlations disappear as soon as we
account for coinciding occupational choices between parents and children.
1 Examples are Kramarz and Nordström Skans (2014), Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2015),
Cingano and Rosolia (2012), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006), Topa (2001), and Edin et al.
(2003).
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We next analyze the relationship between the number and characteristics of
friends and the labor-market outcomes of children. Again, we find that the
quantity and quality of friendship ties do not influence the occupational
choices and earnings prospects of children, with the exception of a small
significant effect shortly after children entered the labor market.
Our paper relates to a few recent papers that focus on the impact
of social networks on labor-market outcomes within an intergenerational
context. Kramarz and Nordström Skans (2014) analyze the relevance of
family and classroom networks for the school-to-work transition of high-
school graduates in Sweden. Using matched employer–employee data taken
from administrative registers, they look at how children’s own parents as
well as the parents of the children’s high-school classmates affect the
likelihood of the children working at similar firms. They find that children
are significantly more likely to start working at firms that also employ
their parents, but not at firms that employ their classmates’ parents. These
family-network effects are most pronounced for low-educated children.
Olivetti et al. (2013) analyze the impact of family and friendship networks
on female labor supply (measured at the intensive margin). Using
intergenerational information taken from the Add Health dataset, they
estimate the extent to which the labor supply of women depends on the
labor supply of their mothers and that of their friends’ mothers. They find
that women work more if they, as teenagers, had working mothers as well
as friends with working mothers. These family and friendship-network
effects are equally strong. Both papers focus on network ties between
children and their parents, and between children and their classmates and
friends. In contrast, we focus on network ties between children, parents,
and their parents’ high-school friends. Therefore, the implications are
different. If, for example, old-boys networks are important in determining
the labor-market outcomes of children, we expect that networks based on
parents and their high-school friends are more suited to pick this up than
networks based on children and their friends’ parents.
Our paper also contributes to a larger body of literature in economics on
the intergenerational effects of economic outcomes. In the context of labor-
market outcomes, there are many empirical studies that report strong and
positive associations between earnings and occupational choices of parents
and their children (Lentz and Laband, 1989; Solon, 1992; Björklund and
Jäntti, 1997). In recent years, a growing number of studies have put more
emphasis on causal intergenerational effects, reporting substantially smaller
parental effect estimates, thus revealing the importance of heritability
and other selection effects (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Plug, 2004;
Holmlund et al., 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the data. We define measures for the size and quality of a
© The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2017.
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friendship network and we discuss the earnings score as a labor-market
outcome. In Section III, we present the estimation results. In Section IV,
we conduct several robustness tests to account for network endogeneity,
network persistency, and network measurement error. Finally, we conclude
in Section V.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The WLS provides detailed survey data on 10,317 individuals who
graduated from high school in 1957, which constitutes a random one-third
sample of all graduates in Wisconsin in that year (e.g., Hauser, 2009;
Sewell et al., 2003).2 Individuals have been interviewed during six waves
(1957, 1964, 1975, 1992, 2004, and 2011) to collect detailed information
on education, labor-market outcomes, and measures of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. In 1975, 18 years after high-school graduation,
individuals were asked to list their high-school friends. In later waves,
respondents were also asked about basic characteristics and some labor-
market outcomes of one of their (randomly selected) children. We use
information on the 6,481 children included in the 2004 wave.3 Table 1
provides summary statistics for the main variables we use in our analysis.
Occupations and Earnings Scores
We focus on the primary occupations of respondents and their children.
Occupations of parents (i.e., respondents) are measured in 1992 when they
are between 52 and 55 years old. For the children, we use occupations
reported in both the 1992 and 2004 survey. Occupations observed in 1992
are those at the beginning of a working career when the children are,
on average, 26 years old. However, some children have not completed
their education at that time and thus are not observed. Furthermore, the
reported occupation might be less representative for individual employment
histories, as young workers are more likely to change occupations again
at a later stage. Therefore, we mainly focus our analysis on occupations
observed in 2004 when the age of their children ranges from 28 to 50
2 We thank the National Institute on Aging (AG-9775), the National Science Foundation
(SBR-9320660), the Spencer Foundation, and the Center for Demography and Ecology and
the Vilas Estate Trust at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their support in collecting
and disseminating data from the WLS. Only we bear the responsibility for the further analysis
or interpretation of these data. Data and documentation from the WLS are available at
http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/WLS/wlsearch.htm.
3 Reasons for the difference between the initial number of respondents and the number of
children in the 2004 survey include childlessness, usual sample attrition, and in some cases
refusal to answer the WLS questionnaires.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Observations
Child outcomes
Earnings score 1992 27.87 19.71 5,373
Earnings score 2004 35.94 20.37 5,969
Child characteristics
Female 0.48 0.50 6,481
Age (in 2004) 38.05 4.12 6,479
Parent characteristics
Female 0.54 0.50 6,481
Age (in 1992) 53.14 0.49 6,480
Earnings score 1992 32.27 20.40 6,024
Years of college 1.81 2.66 6,288
IQ score 101.64 14.47 6,481
Extraversion score 3.91 1.03 6,273
Agreeableness score 3.87 0.95 6,274
Conscientiousness score 3.12 1.09 6,273
Neuroticism score 4.86 0.78 6,271
Openness score 4.87 0.76 6,271
years, with an average of 38 years. Previous studies have shown that
current income within this range proxies lifetime income most accurately
for the US (e.g., Haider and Solon, 2006).
In the WLS, occupational choices of respondents and their children are
coded in line with the definitions of the US census in 1990. We use two
classification schemes in our analysis. The first classification summarizes
occupations into 18 distinct categories. Corresponding frequency
distributions for both respondents and their children can be found in
the Online Appendix. The second classification summarizes occupations
into 501 distinct categories. In the latter case, the WLS provides various
measures of occupational prestige, such as educational requirements, and
average earning prospects. We focus on the occupational earnings score,
which indicates the fraction of workers in a given occupation earning at
least US$14.30 per hour in 1989 according to 1990 US census data.4
A comparison between the respondents’ annual earnings (defined as the
sum of wages, salaries, commissions, and tips before taxes and other
deductions) and earnings scores in 1992 shows that both measures are
4 Hauser and Warren (1997) provide a review of measures of occupational status, including
various occupational earnings scores. One measures the percentage of workers in an occupation
who earn more than US$25,000 in 1989. Another measures the percentage of workers in an
occupation who earn US$14.30 per hour or more in 1989. This wage rate corresponds to
earnings of US$25,000 per year for workers who work 35 hours per week and 50 weeks per
year.
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strongly correlated.5 Thus, the occupational earnings score can be regarded
as a good proxy for labor-income prospects.
Using earnings scores has several advantages in the analysis of
occupational choices. First, it provides a continuous measure of the average
returns to occupational choices. As the earnings score is the same for
all workers in a given occupation, the measure abstracts from earning
differences due to individual heterogeneity and quantifies the potential
payoff independently of worker-specific skills. This reduces the threat
of biased estimates because of correlations between unobserved ability
and earnings. Second, and more importantly, the earnings score can be
interpreted as a proxy for lifetime earnings. Occupational choices are
evaluated not only in terms of current payoffs, but also with respect to
the average earnings across all workers in the US census. Interpreting
the score as a measure of lifetime earnings implicitly assumes that the
occupation does not change considerably during the life cycle with respect
to prospective earnings. A comparison between reported occupations in
1992 and 2004 shows that the earnings scores vary only modestly, with
correlation coefficients of 0.72 and 0.49 for parents and children,
respectively.
As shown in Table 1, the earnings score averages are 27.9 and 35.9
percentage points for children in 1992 and 2004, and 32.3 percentage points
for parents in 1992. As expected, earnings scores are, on average, considerably
lower for children at the start of their occupational career. A difference-
in-means test between the 1992 score of parents and the 2004 score of
children also confirms that the younger generation works in occupations with
significantly higher earnings scores (p < 0.0001), suggesting intergenerational
differences in occupational choices.6 To get a better idea of the distribution
of earnings scores, Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution for children
and parents. It shows that earnings scores vary between the 4th and the 88th
percentile and are relatively equally distributed apart from a slightly concave
shape at higher percentiles. Compared with actual annual earnings of WLS
respondents, the distribution of earnings scores is by construction smoother
and has no outliers.
Friendship Measures
In 1975, respondents are asked to list the three best same-sex friends
from their high-school senior class. The WLS contains information about
5 The correlation between workers’ annual earnings and earnings score in 1992 is 0.46 with
a p-value of less than 0.001. As actual earnings are not reported for children of respondents,
we cannot compute the same correlation for this generation.
6 Comparing earnings scores between children and parents of the same wave, in 1992 or 2004,
leads to similar results.
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Fig. 1. Occupational earnings score distribution
the number of claims that can be matched to other high-school graduates
in the cohort.7 Some of the claims are matched to other high-school
graduates in the WLS, which allows us to reconstruct substantial parts of
the friendship network in high school.8 As the WLS sample represents a
one-third share of all Wisconsin high-school graduates in 1957, survey data
on characteristics of friends are available for approximately this fraction of
friendship claims. According to previous research, US students form the
majority of friendships within high school (Ennett and Bauman, 1996).
Thus, the claims should capture the respondents’ friends in 1957 reasonably
well.
For each respondent in the WLS, we observe friendship links that
are nominated by the individual (outgoing connections), as well as links
with the individual that are nominated by other respondents (incoming
connections). Borrowing the terminology of graph theory, we call the
number of outgoing connections the out-degree, and the number of
incoming connections the in-degree. Furthermore, we observe whether
7 In some cases, this number deviates from the number initially reported if respondents cannot
remember their friend’s full name, misspell the name, or claim by mistake friends outside the
cohort.
8 Conti et al. (2013) use this feature of the WLS friendship data to study the impact of
popularity on labor-market outcomes.
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connections are reciprocal and nominated by both sides (reciprocated
connections). These friendship connections are arguably stronger and more
persistent than non-reciprocated connections and can be used to measure
network effects for two different strengths of friendship ties. We refer
to reciprocated connections as strong connections.9 Next, we construct a
measure that takes all connections of a respondent in high school into
account (total friendship connections). It is defined as the sum of the
out-degree and in-degree connections corrected for double counting of
the reciprocated friendship connections.
These friendship measures are subject to systematic measurement error.
In particular, the observed in-degrees are incomplete because the WLS
data cover only one-third of all potential high-school friends. Whether a
respondent is claimed as a friend is observed only for connections who
are interviewed by the WLS. As a result, complete coverage of reciprocal
friends and total friendship connections are not available. To illustrate
this, Figure 2 depicts an example of a high-school graduate who claims
three friends and is also claimed as a friend by three other individuals.
In this case, the in-degree is not fully observed because some friendship
connections are outside the WLS. Furthermore, we do not observe for all
claimed friends whether they are reciprocal.
Given that respondents with high in-degrees are more likely to
have unobserved claims, missing observations introduce non-classical
measurement error to the size of the network, which might lead to biased
regression estimates. To correct the friendship measure for this error, we
impute the expected number of received friendship claims based on the
observed distribution and selection probability for each potential claim. As
respondents can claim only same-sex friends, the imputation is performed
separately for the number of female and male friends (see the Appendix).10
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the number of connections
(network size) for each of the four friendship measures in the top panel.
As shown in the first row, respondents claim, on average, 2.25 friends
with a standard deviation of almost one friend. However, less than half
of these claims are actually reciprocated. Contrary to that, the average
number of received friends (in-degree) is similar to the out-degree, but
shows a higher variation, as the number of claims is not restricted to
three friends in this case. The last row summarizes the distribution of
9 Similarly, social-network theory distinguishes between weak and strong connections to qualify
interpersonal ties. According to the weak tie hypothesis initiated by Granovetter (1973), weaker
connections are more relevant for the impact of social networks because individuals outside
the direct social environment can also be reached. However, other studies argue that strong
ties are of prior importance because more interaction takes place and more information is
transmitted among these connections (e.g., Krackhardt, 1992).
10 The imputation procedure is not applicable to the characteristics of female and male friends.
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Fig. 2. Friendship ties in the network of Wisconsin high-school graduates
total connections, showing that an average individual is connected to 3.27
high-school friends. Furthermore, we observe that the average number of
connections differs with respect to gender. According to all four friendship
measures, female respondents have more connections than males.11
Table 2 also provides summary statistics for the average earnings score
in all friendship categories in the bottom panel. As social contacts with
high earnings scores might be better able to assist children in finding
equally well-paid jobs, this variable can be regarded as a proxy for the
quality of the network. For each of the four friendship measures, we
compute the average earnings score across all observed connections.12
Here systematic measurement error is less of a concern. Although not all
high-school graduates are interviewed and information on earnings scores
is available only for some friends, the friendship data are missing at
random, conditional on the number of connections, because respondents
11 It is possible to compare the number of out-degree friendships in Table 2 with other
estimates of out-degree friendships. In the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
(Add Health), for example, high-school students are asked to nominate five (and not three)
same-sex high-school friends. Fletcher et al. (2013) report average numbers of nominated
friends of 2.65 for male students and 3.10 for female students. Although their numbers of
out-degree friendship connections are (only a little) larger than ours, they are similar in that
male students nominate fewer friends than female students.
12 We have experimented with alternative friendship quality measures such as the maximum
earnings score of friends. Our friendship quality results appear to be insensitive to the quality
measures we use (see the Online Appendix for regression results using the maximum earnings
score of friends as the explaining variable).
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Table 2. The quantity and quality of friendship connections
Full sample Female Male
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Number of friends
Out-degree 2.25 0.94 6,191 2.37 0.87 3,356 2.11 0.99 2835
Reciprocated 1.08 0.54 6,191 1.20 0.52 3,356 0.95 0.53 2,835
In-degree 2.10 1.27 6,191 2.23 1.18 3,356 1.95 1.34 2,835
Total connections 3.27 1.34 6,191 3.40 1.22 3,356 3.12 1.46 2,835
Earnings score of friends
Out-degree 32.72 19.81 2,859 24.75 17.25 1,604 42.90 18.14 1,255
Reciprocated 32.04 19.87 1,466 25.35 17.68 893 42.46 18.58 573
In-degree 31.43 18.80 2,613 24.15 16.34 1,476 40.87 17.54 1,137
Total connections 32.09 18.79 3,716 24.09 16.10 2,043 41.85 17.15 1,673
Notes: The number of reciprocated, in-degree, and total friendship connections are corrected for measurement error.
are selected randomly. This means that our measure of friendship quality
is an unbiased measure of network quality.13
Parental Characteristics
The WLS contains information on cognitive and non-cognitive skills of
the respondents. Cognitive skills are measured in the 1957 wave by
means of the Henmon–Nelson test of mental ability. The test score results
are converted to standard IQ scores. Non-cognitive skills are assessed
in the 1992 wave, together with information on the respondents’ labor-
market careers, based on the Big Five Inventory developed by John et al.
(1991). Five personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism) are taken from five to seven questionnaire
items for each trait, where the magnitude of these item attributes are
measured on a one-to-six scale. Using this information, we calculate
average scores for each personality trait. To avoid imprecise measurement,
scores are coded as missing if respondents answer fewer than two items per
attribute. According to the five-factor model, the combination of these traits
provides a proficient summary of individual personality (Goldberg, 1990;
Costa and McCrae, 1992). In our analysis, we think of these cognitive and
13 There is another issue of sample selection; that is, respondents with more friends are over-
represented because characteristics of friends are less likely missing. Of course, missing
earnings scores could also be imputed based on available data. This requires additional
assumptions on the earnings score distribution across friends. If we assume linear dependence
between the earnings scores of a respondent’s friends, we can impute values for all friendship
claims and test the sensitivity of our network quality results. We find that our results do not
change in any meaningful way.
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non-cognitive skill variables as fixed when parents form their friendships
(Grönqvist et al., 2017 report that in Swedish data the correlation between
cognitive skills measured at age 13 and 18 is 0.87).
III. Empirical Analysis
Occupational Choice
Table 3 reports the observed matches in main occupations between children
and their parents and between children and the high-school friendship
connections of their parents. Matches refer to those children who work
in the same occupation as their parents and as their parents’ friends.
Occupations are based on the 18 main occupation categories.14 When
focusing on the friendship connections of parents, for each child, we
divide the number of matches by the number of friendship connections.
The reported shares represent averages across all individuals. To test
for associations between occupational choices, we compare the observed
matching rates with those that would result from random matching.
Assuming that occupational choices are random draws from the empirical
distributions of children, parents, and parents’ friends, we calculate for
each subgroup the expected share of random matches.
Table 3 provides results for matches with occupations of children
measured in both 1992 and 2004. Using early occupational choices of
children (upper panel), we find that in about 16 percent of all cases, the
occupations of parents and children match. This is significantly different
from the 11 percent matches that would occur if parents and children
would randomly choose their occupations. The observed matching share
with the parents’ friends of 13 percent is considerably lower, but still
significantly different from the random matching share, regardless of the
type of friendship connections.
One explanation for the observed matches with parents’ friends might
be that occupational choices of the friends are correlated with those of the
parents, and thus simply proxy the direct intergenerational link. To account
for this possibility, we additionally calculate the matching shares between
children and friends for the subsample of children who do not work in
the same occupation as their parents. We find that the matching share
falls to 11 percent, which resembles the random matching share. This
suggests that children are significantly more likely to end up working in
occupations in which their parents work, but not in occupations in which
14 An analysis based on the more detailed occupation codes leads by construction to very few
matches, which makes a reliable evaluation difficult. In the next subsection, we return to the
detailed occupational codes.
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Table 3. Observed and random matches with main occupations of children
Match with Observed match Random match p-value
Major occupation of children in 1992
Parent 0.156 0.114 0.000
Total connections of parent 0.132 0.116 0.002
– if parent’s occupation different 0.111 0.109 0.372
Major occupation of children in 2004
Parent 0.173 0.120 0.000
Total connections of parent 0.138 0.124 0.004
– if parent’s occupation different 0.119 0.115 0.211
Notes: The p-value corresponds to a one-sided t-test of the hypothesis that observed matching rates exceed random
matching rates.
their parents’ friends work once the occupation of parents is taken into
account.
When we use occupations of children in 2004 (lower panel of Table 3),
we find that matching shares are larger in all three cases. However, random
matches are also more likely here. As for the early earnings scores, the
t-tests indicate a significant association between major occupations of
children and their parent’s friends, which disappears if we focus only on
children that do not work in the same occupation as their parents.15
Earnings Score
While children do not choose the same occupations as their parents’ friends
(once we account for the occupational choices of parents), it does not
mean that parents’ friends do not have any influence on the labor-market
outcomes of children. The parents’ friends might, for instance, help or
motivate children to get into better-paid occupations other than their own.
To examine such a potential payoff of friendship connections, we estimate
a linear relationship between the prospective earnings of children and the
friendship network of parents of the following form
Y ci =+FNi +X ci + X pi +ui, (1)
where Y ci is the earnings score of a child in family i and FNi is the
friendship-network measure of the parent. Our parameter of interest is
, which captures the network effect on the child’s earnings score. We
15 In the Online Appendix, we also report occupational matching shares for mothers, fathers,
sons, daughters, and combinations thereof. For all parent–child combinations, we find that
the observed similarity in occupational choices among children and their parent’s friends is
(almost fully) driven by the observed similarity in occupational choices among children and
their parents.
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estimate the model using ordinary least squares (OLS). To give a causal
interpretation to , the friendship network should be independent of the
error term ui, conditional on the observed characteristics of the child
and the parent (X ci and X
p
i , respectively). The observed characteristics
should thus include variables that are related to the formation of a
friendship network, which are probably characteristics other than just the
basic characteristics such as gender and age. In the estimation, we use
varying sets of observed characteristics including the cognitive and non-
cognitive skill measures of parents.
As the network measure FNi, we consider both the quantity and the
quality of the friendship network of the parent. For network quantity, we
use the total number of connections, which is defined as the sum of out-
degree and in-degree friends corrected for double counting of reciprocal
connections.16 For network quality, we use the average earnings scores
of the parents’ friends. To show how observed characteristics affect the
impact of friendship ties, we consecutively extend the set of control
variables in the regression equation. For each friendship measure, the
sample is restricted to individuals for whom information on the full
set of characteristics is available. Furthermore, we perform the analysis
separately for female and male respondents, to account for potential gender
differences.
The earnings score of children is measured in 1992 and in 2004. While
we use both earnings measures in our estimations, we consider the results
for the 2004 earnings score more valuable. With the 1992 earnings score
measure, we estimate network effects on censored samples of children
who just entered the labor market when earnings differences are not that
pronounced (yet). With the 2004 earnings score measure, we estimate
network effects on uncensored samples of children who are in their peak
earnings years when earnings represent lifetime earnings.
Number of Friends (Size of the Network)
Table 4 reports the impact on the earnings score of children in 2004 for
six different specifications, where we use the total number of friendship
connections as a measure for the size of the network. In Column 1, we
show the marginal friendship effect in a model without other covariates.
The coefficient is significantly different from zero and indicates that
one additional friendship connection of the parent is associated with
an earnings score increase of the child of 0.534 percentage points.
However, the estimated association is very small given an earnings-score
16 All estimates are based on the corrected friendship measures. Marginal effects for the
(uncorrected) observed number of connections are summarized in the Online Appendix.
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Table 4. Marginal network-size effects on the child’s earnings score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Friendship connections 0.534*** 0.536*** 0.585*** 0.372* 0.307 0.214
(0.204) (0.200) (0.201) (0.200) (0.199) (0.198)
Child controls
Female −7.959*** −7.836*** −7.959*** −7.953*** −7.967***
(0.547) (0.544) (0.540) (0.536) (0.531)
Age (in 2004) 4.463*** 4.509*** 4.251*** 4.056*** 3.851***
(1.124) (1.120) (1.110) (1.102) (1.093)
Age squared −0.062*** −0.062*** −0.058*** −0.055*** −0.051***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Parent controls
Female −0.0629 −0.391 1.889*** 1.887***
(0.579) (0.575) (0.627) (0.621)
Extraversion score 0.353 0.627** 0.608** 0.614**
(0.281) (0.280) (0.278) (0.276)
Agreeableness score −1.138*** −0.755* −0.623 −0.536
(0.390) (0.388) (0.386) (0.383)
Conscientiousness score 0.412 0.519 0.480 0.500
(0.376) (0.373) (0.370) (0.367)
Neuroticism score −0.331 −0.0300 0.0516 0.0640
(0.277) (0.276) (0.274) (0.272)
Openness score 1.777*** 1.126*** 0.691** 0.178
(0.311) (0.315) (0.316) (0.318)
IQ score 0.195*** 0.151*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Earnings score 1992 0.137*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.016)
Years of education 1.124***
(0.118)
Intercept 34.12*** −41.62** −46.80** −64.03*** −60.99*** −52.20**
(0.729) (20.89) (21.02) (20.90) (20.75) (20.60)
Observations 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,290
Notes: The dependent variable is the child’s earnings score measured in 2004. The independent variable of interest
is the total number of friendship connections measured in 1992. Regressions contain varying sets of controls.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** , and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
standard deviation of approximately 20 percentage points. In Columns
2–5, we add characteristics to the regression model that are arguably
exogenous, including the child’s gender and age, and measures of parents’
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In Column 2, we find that adding child
characteristics does not alter the estimated network coefficient. The
estimates for gender and age are nonetheless statistically significant and
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similar to those found in most other wage regressions; that is, the earnings
score is lower for women and concave in age. In Column 3, we also find
that including personality traits does not change the friendship effect. Of
the five personality traits, only agreeableness and openness to experiences
affect the child’s earnings score in a statistically significant way.17 In
Column 4, we add parental IQ and find that the total number of friendship
connections continues to have a small but marginally significant effect on
the child’s earnings score. Parental IQ itself has a significantly positive
impact, which suggests that high-IQ parents have, on average, more high-
school friends, as well as more children who are more successful in the
labor market.
In Columns 5 and 6, we also control for the earnings score and years
of education of parents. However, including these parental characteristics
as control variables in the earnings-score regressions can be called into
question. In case parents’ friends help parents to find jobs in higher-paying
occupations, or influence their educational qualifications that enable parents
to work in higher-paying occupations, the parents’ educational attainment
and earnings scores are outcome variables rather than control variables.
Nonetheless, if we control for the parents’ earnings score and years of
education, we find that the estimated network coefficient does not change
much. The impact of parents’ friends on the child’s earnings score is
still insignificantly small, holding parental education, occupational earnings
score, and other characteristics constant. As such, these findings coincide
with those from the previous subsection, where the friendship connections
of parents had no effect anymore after conditioning on parental outcomes.
So far, our analysis has focused on the earnings score of children in
2004, when most children are about 38 years old and likely work in
their primary lifetime occupation. However, it is possible that friendship
networks of parents are stronger at earlier stages of the child’s occupational
career. Job-market entrants might benefit more from social networks of
their parents because they are less well connected themselves and less
informed about employment prospects than older workers. Furthermore,
employers are less able to evaluate the productivity of young workers and,
thus, rely more often on informal referrals (see Hensvik and Nordström
Skans, 2016). Alternatively, children might spend more time with their
parents at young ages and better benefit from their friendship network.
To detect whether network effects are stronger in entry-level occupations,
we repeat our analysis using the earnings score of children measured in
17 In the WLS, Müller and Plug (2006) observe comparable personality patterns for earnings.
Among fathers, they find positive returns for non-agreeableness and openness to experiences.
Among mothers, they find positive returns for contentiousness and openness to experiences.
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Table 5. Marginal network-size effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample
Child earnings score 1992 0.595*** 0.571*** 0.495** 0.417**
(N = 4,909) (0.205) (0.194) (0.195) (0.194)
Child earnings score 2004 0.534*** 0.536*** 0.372* 0.214
(N = 5,290) (0.204) (0.200) (0.200) (0.198)
Mothers
Child earnings score 1992 0.543* 0.772*** 0.636** 0.592**
(N = 2,643) (0.310) (0.295) (0.295) (0.294)
Child earnings score 2004 0.762** 0.812*** 0.574* 0.457
(N = 2,791) (0.313) (0.307) (0.305) (0.302)
Fathers
Child earnings score 1992 0.579** 0.478* 0.402 0.291
(N = 2,266) (0.277) (0.261) (0.261) (0.258)
Child earnings score 2004 0.428 0.374 0.218 0.031
(N = 2,499) (0.272) (0.267) (0.267) (0.261)
Child characteristics   
Parent characteristics  
Parent outcomes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the child’s earnings score measured in 1992 or 2004. The independent variable
is the number of friends. Each estimate involves OLS regressions with varying sets of controls. Child controls
include gender, age, and age squared. Parental controls include gender, five personality traits, and IQ test scores.
Parental outcomes include earnings score and years of schooling. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** , and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
1992. At this early stage, most children are about 26 years old, just
finished their education, and started working in their first occupation.18
The upper panel of Table 5 reports the network-effect estimates for entry-
level occupations using the earnings score of children in 1992 as the
outcome variable. We find that the number of friends has a stronger impact
12 years earlier. The estimates are also less sensitive to the inclusion of
parent covariates, leading to consistently higher and statistically significant
effects. In the richest specification, we find that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the number of connections raises the earnings score of children
by approximately 0.559 percentage points. However, compared with the
overall variation in earnings scores, the network effects in entry-level
occupations are at most modest.
18 It is possible that some of the children in our sample have not finished their university
education yet and report to work in a part-time or student jobs. However, the WLS occupations
are reported only if children have worked at least six months in the same occupation.
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Next, we split up the sample by gender of parent to test whether
the mother’s network has a different influence on their children than the
father’s network. We expect to see differences for a number of reasons.
First, respondents of the WLS are asked to report same-sex friends; that
is, we observe only the male friends for fathers and female friends for
mothers. Second, simple network averages already show that mothers have
a larger network than fathers. Third, previous studies report different
intergenerational correlations for mothers and fathers (see the review by
Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). When we run our network regressions on
samples of mothers and fathers separately, we find that the small but
positive friendship effects on the earnings score of children are mostly
driven by the network of mothers. Table 5 shows that the network effects
of mothers are all positive but get smaller when covariates are added.
When we include the full set of covariates, we find that maternal network
effects on child earnings scores measured in 2004 are insignificant. The
impact on early occupations again remains significant, but the estimated
coefficient of 0.592 earnings-score points is still small when compared
with the overall variation in earnings scores. The network effects of fathers
are, in most specifications, smaller than the network effects of mothers,
and not statistically significant. When we use the children’s early score
in 2004 as the outcome, the impact of the father’s friends is almost zero
in the richest specification.
Furthermore, we test whether network effects are different for daughters
and sons. As shown in the Online Appendix, the estimated coefficients
are very similar. If we split the sample by both gender of parent and
gender of child, we find that connections of mothers have a much larger
impact on their sons, suggesting that the network effect is fully driven
by this subsample. On the contrary, the number of father’s friends has a
stronger effect for daughters.
To see whether network effects are driven by a particular friendship
channel, we decompose the total number of friends into non-reciprocated
out-degree, non-reciprocated in-degree and reciprocated connections.19
With these three friendship connection measures, we can estimate a more
general specification of the earnings-score equation. Table 6 presents
regression estimates using non-reciprocated out-degree, non-reciprocated
in-degree, and reciprocated friendship connections as the right-hand-
side variables. We find that non-reciprocated claimed friendships (out-
degree) have a stronger association with the child’s earnings score than
19 Note that total in-degree, total out-degree and reciprocated connections do not add up to the
total number friends. Therefore, we subtract reciprocated connections from in- and out-degrees
for the regression. In the Online Appendix, we also report results for regressions where the
separate friendship channels are included in isolation.
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– non-reciprocated out-degree 0.709 0.756
(0.514) (0.525)
– non-reciprocated in-degree 0.424* 0.383
(0.234) (0.239)
– reciprocated 0.195 −0.669
(0.552) (0.564)
Observations 4,909 5,290
Notes: The dependent variable is the child’s earnings score measured in 1992 or 2004. The independent variable
in the top panel is the total number or friendship connections. The independent variables in the bottom panel are
the number of non-reciprocated out-degree, non-reciprocated in-degree, and reciprocated friendship connections.
The estimates reported in the top and bottom panels come from two separate OLS regressions using the full set
of controls. Child controls include gender, age, and age squared. Parental controls include gender, five personality
traits, and IQ test scores. Parental outcomes include earnings score and years of schooling. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, ** , and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
non-reciprocated received friendship claims (in-degree). The number of
reciprocated friendships shows the smallest point estimates. Due to large
standard errors, almost none of the coefficients is significantly different
from zero. As for the composed measure, all effects are consistently larger
when we use the earnings score in 1992 as the outcome.
Earnings Score of Friends (Quality of Network)
We next take another perspective on friendship ties and examine whether
network quality, as proxied by the average earnings score of friends, has an
impact on the child’s outcome. As not all claims are observed, the sample
size reduces by approximately two-thirds. Table 7 presents the estimation
results for the average earnings score of friendship connections for the
full sample and by gender of parent (in the same format as before).
The results in Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table
5 for network size. If we do not control for child and parent characteristics,
the average earnings score has a significantly positive impact on the
earnings score of children, even though the network effect is moderate
in size. A one-percentage-point increase in the average earnings score
of friends raises the earnings score of children in 1992 and 2004 by
approximately 0.04 and 0.07 percentage points, respectively. As before,
the network estimates decrease considerably when we add child and parent
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Table 7. Marginal network-quality effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample
Child earnings score 1992 0.040** 0.063*** 0.047** 0.033
(N = 2,943) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Child earnings score 2004 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.026 0.006
(N = 3,189) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Mothers
Child earnings score1992 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.071**
(N = 1,602) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Child earnings score 2004 0.086*** 0.077** 0.048 0.038
(N = 1,709) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Fathers
Child earnings score 1992 0.018 0.041 0.018 −0.009
(N = 1,341) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Child earnings score 2004 0.054* 0.041 0.006 −0.030
(N = 1,480) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Child characteristics   
Parent characteristics  
Parent outcomes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the child’s earnings score measured in 1992 or 2004. The independent variable
is the average earnings score of friends measured in 1992. Each estimate involves OLS regressions with varying sets
of controls. Child controls include gender, age, and age squared. Parental controls include gender, five personality
traits, and IQ test scores. Parental outcomes include earnings score and years of schooling. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ***, ** , and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
control variables. Here, the effect turns insignificant for both earnings
scores. If we look again at the network effects for mothers and fathers
separately, we observe similar patterns as before although differences by
gender of parent are less pronounced here. As maternal friends again show
a stronger impact, the point estimate for the earnings score measured in
1992 remains statistically significant in the richest specification.
IV. Robustness Checks
Our regression results indicate that parental-friendship connections have
little, if any, influence on the prospective earnings of children. This
is by no means a trivial finding if friends of parents provide children
with valuable information about job opportunities. We, therefore, perform
additional robustness checks to see how sensitive our parental-network
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estimates are to a number of potential threats: network endogeneity, network
recall and measurement error, and network persistency.
Network Endogeneity
One natural concern is that the size and characteristics of friendship
networks are endogenously determined. If there are unobserved factors
that enable parents to form friendships and help their children to obtain
better job qualifications, our network effects are biased and probably too
high. However, in the absence parental-network effects, this appears less
of a concern, unless parental-network effects are negative.20
To explore the role of these unobserved factors in more detail, we
repeat the friendship analysis in the context of a friendship fixed-effects
model. If high-school friends share some of the unobserved factors that
are correlated with their social network and the earnings score of their
children, the inclusion of friendship fixed effects in our regression models
takes those unobserved factors into account. We construct pairs of parents
with their first-claimed friend, and we assume that these pairs share the
same fixed effect. In the empirical analysis, we thus identify the parental-
network effect from the unshared high-school friends within the friendship
pairs. Our friendship fixed-effects sample excludes (by construction) all
parents without friends and contains 926 friendship pairs.21
Table 8, Panel B, reports the fixed-effects estimates for the total number
of friends and the average earnings score of friends. Comparing these
estimates with our baseline estimates, reported in Panel A, we find that
most estimated network effects are smaller and even slightly negative. We
also find that the fixed-effects estimates change less when we add other
control variables. This is not surprising. If friends indeed share (some of)
the confounding factors that might bias our network results, we should
find that our fixed-effects estimates are insensitive to the inclusion of
cognitive and non-cognitive skill measures. The only significant coefficients
are measured for the impact of network quality on the earnings score of
children in 2004, but the negative point estimates turn insignificant when
we include the full set of controls. As the friendship fixed-effects network
estimates continue to be small and mostly insignificant, we do not think
that unobserved factors (shared by friends) mask the weak network effects
we reported in the previous section.
20 Two studies find negative, but modest, network effects (Bentolila et al., 2010; Pellizzari,
2010). In our context of parental-friendship networks, their argument would be that children
are pressed, or advised, to choose occupations that are closer to those of their parents’ friends
but lesser fit to their own skills.
21 Even though some claims are reciprocated, each friendship pair is included only once in
the analysis.
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Table 9. Measurement error and marginal network-size effects
VAR(U) VAR(FN*) VAR(U)/VAR(FN)  SE / SE()
0.0 1.86 0% 0.534 0.204 2.61
0.2 1.66 11% 0.599 0.216 2.77
0.4 1.46 22% 0.681 0.231 2.95
0.6 1.26 32% 0.788 0.248 3.18
0.8 1.06 43% 0.937 0.271 3.46
1.0 0.86 54% 1.154 0.300 3.84
1.2 0.66 65% 1.502 0.343 4.38
1.4 0.46 75% 2.150 0.410 5.24
1.6 0.26 86% 3.785 0.544 6.96
1.8 0.06 97% 15.788 1.111 14.21
Notes: The dependent variable is the child’s earnings score measured in 2004. The independent variable is the
number of friends. Results are reported for different noise-to-signal ratios. Column 1 reports the assumed variance
of the measurement error VAR(U ). Column 2 reports the variance of the true number of friends VAR(FN *), which
equals VAR(FN )−VAR(U ). Column 3 reports the noise-to-signal ratio. Columns 4–6 report corresponding network
effects, together with standard errors and t-values.
Network Measurement Error
Another concern is measurement error in our network measures. We
construct the measures based on information about high-school friends
that is collected 18 years after high-school graduation. When parents make
mistakes or have difficulties in recalling who their best friends are, there
is measurement error in our network measure. If the measurement error
is random, that is, unrelated to the true network measure, the estimated
marginal effects are biased towards zero (classical measurement error). To
test for the impact of this error, we treat the friendship network measure
as a continuous variable and adjust the parameter estimates and standard
errors by imposing predetermined noise-to-signal ratios in estimation.
Table 9 presents the marginal effects of the number of total friendship
connections on the earnings score of children for different noise-to-signal
ratios (which are reported in Column 3). The estimation results show
only a modest increase in the true network effect for increasing degrees
of measurement error (VAR(U )). Even if half of the observed variation
can be explained by measurement error, the network estimate suggests
that one additional friend increases the earnings score by only 1.154
percentage points, which is still small given an earnings-score standard
deviation of around 20 percentage points. This simulation exercise shows
that small estimates cannot be explained by classical measurement error
in the friendship variables. Taking into account that the marginal effect
further decreases when we control for parent covariates, the underlying
error must be inconceivably high to obtain sizeable estimates.
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Network Persistency
It is also unclear to what extent parents are still in contact with the high-
school friends later in life. Although friends who kept in touch after high
school are more likely to be reported, it is reasonable to assume that some
of the claimed connections have not been maintained. As those friends are
unlikely to affect the labor-market outcomes of each other’s children, they
will, by construction, lower the average impact of friendship connections.
To address this concern, we rely on the most recent survey held under the
WLS respondents. In 2011, the subsample of respondents who had at least
one reciprocal friend in 1975 (complemented with a 15 percent random
draw of other WLS respondents) were asked again to report up to three
same-sex high-school friends they are still in contact with. This sample
contains 1,558 observations. While the questionnaire does not explicitly
refer to friendship claims in 1975, it provides an additional measure of
out-degree network connections that allows us to draw inference on the
importance of high-school connections later in life. Compared with the
initial out-degree, the average number of friendship claims decreases from
2.25 to 1.42. About 40 percent of all the parents report to have the same
number of friends in both waves. The correlation between the 1975 and
2011 out-degree equals 0.20.
Table 8, Panel C, shows whether sustained connections have a stronger
impact on the earnings score of children. When we use the early earnings
score of children as the outcome, we find negative point estimates for all
specifications but none of them is statistically significant. On the contrary,
the effect of sustained friendships on the earnings score in 2004 is larger
compared with the initial out-degree and less sensitive to the inclusion of
control variables. As not all high-school friendships have been maintained
until 2011, it makes sense that the estimated network effect is larger
among the long-lasting friends of parents. However, the estimates remain
small and at most marginally significant, which confirms that high-school
friends of parents have no substantial effect on the earnings score of
children.
V. Conclusion
Motivated by the idea that children might incur labor-market benefits from
their parents’ social network, this study makes a first attempt to empirically
test whether children are better off because their parents have a more
elaborate social network. Using data on high-school connections of parents,
we find evidence that children are slightly more likely to work in the same
occupation as their parent’s friends, but this association disappears once
we take into account the similarity in occupational choices of children and
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parents. When we analyze the network impact on the occupational earnings
score of children (which quantifies the average payoff by occupations),
we find that larger friendship networks of parents significantly increase
the children’s earnings score at the beginning of their working career,
but the measured point estimate is very small. Furthermore, the impact
disappears if we use the earnings score of children 12 years later as the
outcome variable, which we consider a better proxy for lifetime earnings.
These findings together suggest that children do not work in occupations
that pay higher wages because of their parents’ friendship network.
However, our findings are not the result of a well-defined natural
experiment and must be interpreted with care. We can think of two
possible interpretations. The first one is a selection interpretation; that is,
children raised by parents with many high-school friends are different from
children raised by parents with few high-school friends. This is consistent
with the notion of biased network estimates in which omitted variables
relevant to the occupational choice of children are negatively related to
their parents’ friendship network. We have little indication of what these
variables might be. Our sensitivity analysis rules out a number of plausible
candidate variables. This leaves us with the second interpretation, which
takes our findings at face value; that is, children do not take advantage
of their parents’ friends. The recent findings of Kramarz and Nordström
Skans (2014) using network data from Sweden support this view.
Appendix
We impute the expected number of received friendship claims based on the
observed distribution and selection probability for each potential claim. As
respondents can claim only same-sex friends, the imputation is performed
separately for the network of female and male friends. Let p define
the share of Wisconsin high-school graduates in 1957 who are not part
of the WLS. Moreover, assume that the true in-degree for individual i
is described by the variable ini, which takes values k = 0, 1, 2, 3, …, n.
Then, the observed measure can be expressed as ˜ini = ini − b, where b
represents the number of in-degree connections we miss. b follows a
binomial distribution with parameters ini and p (b∼Binomial(ini, p)). To
correct the in-degree, we first impute the distribution of ini based on the
distribution that can be observed for ˜ini. Denote the observed share of
k =0, 1, 2, 3,…, n claims as q̃k and the underlying shares as qk . Then, the








To estimate qk , we minimize the squared difference between observed
shares and their predictions subject to the constraints that the underlying
q values sum to one and are bounded between zero and one:
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ql =1 and 0qk 1∀k. (A2)
As friendship information is available from 9, 138 respondents out of
approximately 3×10, 317 high-school graduates in 1957, the probability
that a graduate is not observed amounts to p=1−9, 138/ (3×10, 317)≈
0.705.22 The potential number of received claims (N ) can theoretically be
as large as the whole population minus one. Given that we observe only
up to six received claims (i.e., q̃k =0 ∀ k > 6), the optimization becomes
less precise if many (or all) potential q values need to be estimated.
Therefore, we assume that the maximum number of potential friends is
43, which corresponds to approximately 25 percent of the average size
of a school cohort in the WLS. As the probability of having more than
43 friends is very close to zero, imposing this restriction barely affects
our results. Finally, the imputed shares {q̂0,…, q̂43} are used to calculate
the expected in-degree of each respondent based on the observed number









For respondents who claim friends that are not covered by the WLS
sample, the number of reciprocated friends is also measured with non-
classical measurement error. Therefore, we impute the expected number of
reciprocated connections exploiting the fact that friendship ties conditional
on the number of claims are missing at random. Again, expected values are
calculated separately for female and male friends. The dynamic imputation
procedure consists of five steps and relies solely on information about
observed reciprocal behavior.
First, respondents are sorted according to the number of claimed
friends (si =0, 1, 2, 3). Next, we calculate the respective average number of
reciprocal friends (r̄s) for the subset of respondents with all connections
in the sample. This information is used to impute expected reciprocated
friendships (r̂s,i) for individuals with one missing claim. After using the
imputed values to update the averages r̄s, we estimate the expected number
22 We have to assume that non-response is uncorrelated with the number of friendship
connections.
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for respondents with two missing claims. Finally, r̄s is updated again and
used to impute values in the case that all three claims are not observed.
The imputation procedure could be further extended by additionally
considering observable characteristics (see Conti et al., 2013), or the
order of claims. However, a further differentiation between friendship ties
would lead to less accurate estimates because they are based on fewer
observations.
Supporting Information
The following supporting information can be found in the online version
of this article at the publisher’s web site.
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